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COMMERCIAL LAW
THOMAS L. POPEJOY*
CLAUDIA L. RAY**

INTRODUCTION

During the survey period the New Mexico appellate courts handed
down several significant and interesting decisions in the area of commercial law. Two decisions' on revocation and breach of warranty under
Article 2 of the New Mexico Uniform Commercial Code 2 (the "U.C.C. ")
are of particular interest because they appear to conflict with each other.
In the area of real estate, the supreme court dealt with two real estate
contract forfeiture cases. 3 The court refused to find wrongful forfeiture
in both cases. For the practitioner these cases emphasize the difficulty
purchasers experience in persuading courts to find wrongful forfeiture.4
One court of appeals decision presents a wealth of law on assignment
of partnerships. 5 The remaining cases resolve contract, real estate, insurance, banking and antitrust issues.6
*J.D., University of New Mexico, 1971; Partner, Popejoy and Leach, P.C., Albuquerque, New
Mexico.
**Member, Class of 1987, University of New Mexico School of Law, Albuquerque, New Mexico.
I. International Paper v. Farrar, 102 N.M. 739, 700 P.2d 642 (1985); General Motors Acceptance
Corp. v. Anaya, 103 N.M. 72, 703 P.2d 169 (1985).
2. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§55-2- 101 to -725 (1978).
3. Jacobs v. Phillippi, 102 N.M. 449, 697 P.2d 132 (1985); Russell v. Richards, 103 N.M. 48,
702 P.2d 993 (1985).
4. See infra note 178.
5. Benton v. Albuquerque National Bank, 103 N.M. 5, 701 P.2d 1025 (Ct. App. 1985).
6. Elephant Butte Resort Marina v. Wooldridge, 102 N.M. 286, 694 P.2d 1351 (1985) (dealing
with the term acceptance of goods under the U.C.C., and condition precedent to performance under
the U.C.C.); Oda Nursery, Inc. v. Garcia Tree and Lawn, Inc., 103 N.M. 438, 708 P.2d 1039
(1985) (dealing with rejection and revocation under the U.C.C.); Albuquerque Tire Co., Inc., v.
Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co., 102 N.M. 445, 697 P.2d 128 (1985) (interpreting
the criteria for finding an adhesion contract); Guthmann v. La Vida Llena, 103 N.M. 506, 709 P.2d
675 (1985) (delineating the elements required to find an adhesion contract); Ledbetter v. Webb, 103
N.M. 597, 711 P.2d 874 (1985) (involving recission, fraud, comparative negligence, pre-judgment
interest and set-off); Grynberg v. Roberts, 102 N.M. 560, 698 P.2d 430 (1985) (discussing prejudgment interest); Paperchase Partnership v. Bruckner, 102 N.M. 221, 693 P.2d 587 (1985) (interpreting the assignment clause frequently found in New Mexico real estate contracts); Boatwright
v. Howard, 102 N.M. 262, 694 P.2d 518 (1985) (deciding whether failure to maintain insurance
required by a real estate contract constitutes default); Naumberg v. Pattison, 103 N.M. 649, 711
P.2d 1387 (1985) (addressing the applicability of the Residential Home Loan Act to recreational
second-homes); Clodfelter v. Plaza, Ltd., 102 N.M. 544, 698 P.2d I (1985) (determining a real
estate broker's entitlement to a full commission even though the property is sold by another broker);
Clovis National Bank v. Harmon, 102 N.M. 166, 692 P.2d 1315 (1984) (discussing debt security,
mortgage foreclosure and pro-rata satisfaction of the debts); F&S Co. v. Gentry, 103 N.M. 54, 702
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I. CONTRACTS
A. U.C.C.-Sale of Goods

The supreme court rendered four decisions under Article 2 of the U.C.C.,
two dealing with revocation of acceptance and breach of warranty, 7 one
dealing with enforceability and modification of a contract' and one with
rejection. 9

1. Breach of Warranty and Revocation of Acceptance
The first case presenting issues of breach of implied warranties and
° . Defendant Farrar
revocation was International Paper Co. v. Farrar"
Produce Company ordered 21,500 boxes from plaintiff to be used for the
packing and shipping of tomatoes and specified that the boxes be suitable
for the intended purpose and of the same type as those supplied to Florida
packers. ' The boxes were delivered but were not the Florida type and
were unsuitable (they collapsed and damaged the tomatoes).' 2 Plaintiff
sued to collect the amount owing from Farrar on the sale of the boxes,
and Farrar counterclaimed alleging breach of implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose.' 3 The New Mexico Supreme Court, after reciting the elements which must be present to find
these implied warranties, affirmed the lower court's findings of breach
of both warranties. "
The supreme court also addressed the issue of whether there was proper
revocation of acceptance under section 55-2-608. 5 The court found sufficient evidence that Farrar notified International as soon as the latent
P.2d 999 (1985) (interpreting provisions of the Recording Act in an action to foreclose a judgment
lien); Vihstadt v. Travelers Insurance Company, 103 N.M. 465, 709 P.2d 187 (1985) (interpreting
the phrase "accidental injury or sickness" in an insurance policy); Weldon v. Commercial Union
Assurance Co., 103 N.M. 522, 710 P.2d 89 (1985) (interpreting the interaction between conflicting
clauses in an insurance policy); United Nuclear Corp. v. Allendale Mutual Ins. Co., 103 N.M. 480,
709 P.2d 649 (1985) (interpreting liability clauses of an insurance policy); Bozza v. General Adjustment Bureau, 103 N.M. 200, 704 P.2d 454 (Ct. App. 1985) (concerning agency and termination
of authority); Landrum v. Security National Bank of Roswell, 104 N.M. 55, 716 P.2d 246 (Ct. App.
1985), cert. quashed, 103 N.M. 798, 715 P.2d 71 (1986) (finding that the adverse claims statute
does not apply to forged endorsement claims); Smith Machinery Corp. v. Hesston, Inc., 102 N.M.
245, 694 P.2d 501 (1985) (an anti-trust action involving the elements of a per se tying claim).
7. International Paper, 102 N.M. 739, 700 P.2d 642; General Motors Acceptance Corp., 103
N.M. 72, 703 P.2d 169.
8. Elephant Butte Resort Marina, Inc. v. Wooldridge, 102 N.M. 286, 694 P.2d 1351 (1985).
9. Oda Nursery, Inc. v. Garcia Tree and Lawn, Inc., 103 N.M. 438, 708 P.2d 1039 (1985).
10. 102 N.M. 739, 700 P.2d 642 (1985).
It. ld. at 740, 741,700 P.2d at 643,644.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 740, 700 P.2d at 643.
14. Id.
15. Id. N.M. STAT. ANN. §55-2-608 (1978).
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defect was discovered and held that upon revocation of acceptance defendant was entitled to recover the price of the boxes plus consequential
damages. "
As a defense to Farrar's counterclaim, International asserted that the
sample boxes initially shown to Farrar became the basis of the bargain
under section 55-2-313(l)(C)."7 International was apparently arguing that
it showed Farrar a sample, that the boxes Farrar received conformed to
the sample, and, thus, Farrar's revocation and claim for damages was
unfounded. This defense failed because Farrar had rejected the sample
box and ordered boxes which conformed to different dimensions and
construction. " Because Farrar rejected the sample it could not have formed
the basis of the bargain.
The second case on revocation and breach of warranty was General
Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Anaya. 9 The plaintiff, General Motors Acceptance Corporation ("GMAC") brought a replevin action under a financing contract for return of an automobile purchased by the Anayas. 2 °
The Anayas counterclaimed against the retailer and GMAC under a revocation of acceptance theory; against the manufacturer, General Motors
Corporation ("GMC"), and the retailer under a breach of express warranty
theory; against GMC and GMAC for willful breach of contract; against
the retailer for fraud or material misrepresentation of fact; and against
GMC and the retailer for violation of the Motor Vehicle Dealers Franchising Act."' At trial, the jury found that the Anayas had successfully
proved all elements essential to establish liability on all claims. By means
of special interrogatories this jury awarded approximately $40,000 in
compensatory damages and $675,000 in punitive damages.22 The trial
court, granting motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, (1)
reduced the compensatory damages to approximately $35,000 on the basis
that the award for breach of warranty was inconsistent with a finding of
revocation of acceptance, (2) eliminated the willful breach of contract
claim and the accompanying punitive damages on the same basis of
16. Id. at 743, 700 P.2d at 646; N.M. STAT. ANN. §55-2-608 Official Comment (I) (1978)
provides that the buyer is no longer required to elect between revocation of acceptance and recovery
of damages for breach.
17. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-2-313(l)(C) (1978) provides: "Any sample or model which is made
part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the whole of the goods shall conform
to the sample or model."
18. 102 N.M. at 741, 743, 700 P.2d at 644, 646.
19. 103 N.M. 72, 703 P.2d 169 (1985).
20. The Anayas counterclaimed on various theories arising out of defects in the automobile which
had not been corrected as required by the warranty. The Anayas defaulted on their payments prompting
the replevin action by GMAC under its financing contract. Id.
21. Motor Vehicle Dealers Franchising Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. § § 57-16-1 to -16, (Cum. Supp.
1985).
22. General Motors, 103 N.M. at 73, 703 P.2d at 170.
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daminconsistency, and (3) eliminated the incidental and consequential
Act.2 3
Franchising
Vehicles
Motor
the
under
awarded
ages
The supreme court affirmed, holding that although the current New
Mexico version of Article 2 of the U.C.C. allows the buyer to bring
claims of both revocation of acceptance and breach of warranty, the nonalternative nature of the remedies does not entitle the buyer to inconsistent
or double recoveries. 24 Stating that the finding of either final acceptance
or revocation of acceptance of non-conforming goods ultimately determines the available remedy, the court held that in this case there was
substantial evidence to support the jury's finding of liability under the
25
plaintiff's claim of revocation of acceptance. Therefore, the court said,
the jury's additional award of damages for breach of warranty was inconsistent as a matter of law, and the judgment notwithstanding the verdict
26
on the damages for breach of warranty was correct.
On the award of punitive damages, the court said there was no support
for the finding of willful breach by GMAC and thus no basis for punitive
damages .27 As to GMC, the court said a finding of revocation of acceptance rendered inconsistent any recovery for willful breach of contract
and thus punitive damages could not be awarded.28
GMC raised the issue of whether the Anayas as buyers had standing
29
to sue it under the Motor Vehicle Dealers Franchising Act. After stating
that the purpose of the Act is to require that the manufacturer of an
automobile be truthful in advertising and properly fulfill any warranty
agreement, the supreme court held that the statutory language, the explicit
legislative objective of ensuring a "sound system" of motor vehicle sale
and distribution within the state, and the intent to provide a remedy for
warranty abuse imply a retail buyer's cause of action against a manu23. Id., see supra note 21.
24. General Motors, 103 N.M. at 74, 703 P.2d at 171. There is no question that double recovery
is not permitted. However, the breakdown in the court's reasoning flows from the premise that, with
revocation, there is no breach. On the contrary, the buyer revokes because there is a breach.
Consequently, whether the buyer claims damages under revocation or breach does not answer the
question of whether the breach was willful.
25. Id. at 75, 703 P.2d at 172. The GMAC court concludes that the evidence was substantial and
persuasive without detailing the evidence presented.
26. Id. The court reasoned that recovery on one claim rendered the other claim inconsistent.
When the jury found the Anayas had successfully proven all elements essential to establish revocation
of acceptance, the breach of warranty theory became extinguished. Id. at 74, 703 P.2d at 171; see
supra note 25.
27. Id. at 75, 703 P.2d at 172. Punitive damages may be awarded by a jury when it finds serious
misconduct on the part of a party. Misconduct coupled with a bad state of mind provide the case
for a punitive damages award. The jury must consider the nature of the defendant's state of mind
and the nature of the conduct. DOBBS, REMEDIES § 3.9, at 205, 207 (1973); see supra note 40 and
accompanying text.
28. General Motors, 103 N.M. at 76, 703 P.2d at 173.
29. Id.
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facturer for such abuse. 30 However, the court agreed that the jury's award
of consequential damages under the Act was cumulative. 3'
International Paper Co. and GMAC are hard to reconcile, and the
holding in GMAC that recovery of punitive damages for willful breach
of contract is barred by a finding of revocation of acceptance appears
contrary to the U.C.C. and principles established by previous New Mexico cases. 32 In International Paper, the supreme court affirmed a trial
court finding of breach of warranty and went on to find that the buyer
had properly revoked the goods and could "recover the price of the boxes
and consequential damages".

33

On the other hand, in GMAC the court

stated that a finding of revocation of acceptance "renders inconsistent
recovery of a claim for breach of warranty" and further that "recovery
for willful breach of contract

. . .

is similarly inconsistent" (emphasis by

the court).34 Comment 1 to section 2-608 of the U.C.C. clearly states
that both "revocation of acceptance and recovery of damages for breach"
are available to a buyer. The damages allowed to a buyer who has revoked
acceptance are set forth in sections 2-711, 35 -71236 and -71337, the latter
of which refers to incidental and consequential damages under section 2715. Under section 2-715, consequential damages include "injury to
person or property approximately resulting from any breach of warranty." 38 Thus, the court's ruling that recovery of damages for breach of
warranty is inconsistent with recovery under a theory of revocation of
acceptance appears directly contrary to the provisions of the U.C.C.
Of perhaps greater concern is GMAC's ruling that recovery under a
30. Id.
31. Id. Once the Anayas recovered their damages under the theory of revocation of acceptance,
recovery under the Motor Vehicle Dealer's Franchising Act would be a double recovery. The court
emphasized that the Anaya's recovery under one theory precluded additional recovery under any
other theory regardless of the validity of each additional theory.
32. See, e.g., Grandi v. LeSage, 74 N.M. 799, 399 P.2d 285 (1965) (approving award of punitive
damages where buyers of racehorse revoked their acceptance).
33. 102 N.M at 743, 700 P.2d at 646.
34. 103 N.M. at 75, 76, 703 P.2d at 172, 173; see supra note 24. This is precisely where the
court's reasoning breaks down. The court leaps from not permitting double recovery under separate
claims to a statement which seems to say that with revocation there is no breach.
35. Section 55-2-711 provides: "Where . .. the buyer justifiably revokes acceptance, then with
respect to any goods involved, and with respect to the whole if the breach goes to the whole
contract ...the buyer may cancel and whether or not he has done so may in addition to recovering
so much of the price as has been paid (a) 'cover' and have damages . . ."
36. Section 55-2-712 provides: "(2) The buyer may recover from the seller as damages the
difference between the cost of cover and the contract price together with any incidental or consequential damages ..."
37. Section 55-2-713 provides: "The measure of damages for non-delivery or repudiation by the
seller is the difference between the market price . . . and the contract price together with any incidental
and consequential damages . ..less expenses saved . . ."
38. Id. at § 55-2-715(2)(b). In reality one sues for breach of contract or breach of warranty. The
remedy depends on whether the buyer keeps the goods or sends them back.
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theory of revocation of acceptance precludes recovery of punitive damages
for willful breach of contract. In Grandi v. LeSage39 , the supreme court
approved the award of punitive damages in a case where the buyers of
a race horse had revoked their acceptance and recovered the purchase
price. Moreover, the appropriateness of punitive damages in a breach of
contract case is normally judged by whether the seller's behavior is
"malicious, intentional, fraudulent, oppressive or committed recklessly
or with a wanton disregard of the wronged party's rights," ' not whether
the buyer has or has not revoked his acceptance under the U.C.C. The
claim of willful breach of contract and the standards for awarding punitive
damages are not even addressed by the U.C.C., making the court's holding in GMAC even harder to understand.
The holding in GMAC confuses a theory of recovery (breach of warranty) with a remedial action (revocation) which in turn determines available damages. 4' Nevertheless, practitioners approaching similar cases must
deal with GMAC in deciding how to plead and present the issues in each
case. 42 Under the U.C.C., the critical factor to a damages determination
becomes the finding of either final acceptance or revocation of acceptance
of nonconforming goods.4 3 Revocation damages are computed under section 55-2-711 and damages after acceptance under section 2-714." However, in view of GMAC, the practitioner representing a buyer must carefully
evaluate all elements of a claim when there are substantial damages. If
the claim merits punitive damages then the practitioner may have to pursue
the willful breach of contract claim over any revocation claim the client
may have.45 The seller, on the other hand, will benefit substantially by
proving revocation which may then cut off any possible punitive damage
claim according to GMAC.
As always the practitioner may seek to limit and distinguish GMAC to
prevent the case from extending an erroneous interpretation of the U.C. C.
and New Mexico case law.' Or the practitioner may argue that what the
court meant by the language used was that the buyer may recover under
section 2-711 or section 2-714 of the U.C.C., but not both.47 This is
precisely what the U.C.C. requires and the way that double recovery is
39. 74 N.M. 799, 399 P.2d 285 (1965).
40. Fredenburgh v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 79 N.M. 593, 598, 446 P.2d 868, 873 (1968).
41. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 55-2-608 and -711; see supra text accompanying notes 24, 25.
42. Id.
43. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
44. See supra notes 17, 25, 37-40; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-2-714 (1978) "Where the buyer has
accepted goods ... the 'measure of' damages for breach of warranty is the difference at the time
and place of acceptance between the value of the goods accepted and the value they would have
had as warranted . .."
45. See supra notes 41, 42 and accompanying text.
46. See supra text accompanying notes 33-42.
47. See supra notes 17, 37, 38, 39, 46.
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avoided. This election, however, should not require the denial of punitive
damages when the buyer has revoked as a breach must be found regardless
of the section under which the buyer elects to recover damages.
2. Enforceability and Modification of Contract.
While the unusual facts of ElephantButte ResortMarina,Inc. v. Wooldridge may limit its precedential value, the case clearly delineates the
U.C.C. approach to the enforceability and modification of contracts."
The case arose out of the purchase of a boat by defendant Wooldridge
from plaintiff Elephant Butte Resort Marina, Inc. ("Marina"). 4 9 The
parties entered into a purchase contract with financing terms set forth on
the first page of the contract, contemplating that Wooldridge would apply
for a loan on those terms through a bank.5" The bank was willing to
finance the purchase, but the terms of the bank loan conflicted with the
contract terms. 5 After using the new boat for about four weeks, Wooldridge attempted to cancel the contract, claiming that it conflicted with
the financing plan offered by the bank. 52 The boat was returned to Marina,
and it brought suit for the amount due on the contract. 53 The trial court
granted judgment for Marina of $586.40, which represented the remaining
amount due after crediting Marina with the
"used" value of the boat and
54
the value of Wooldridge's trade-in boat.
On appeal, the supreme court affirmed, holding that the contract met
the U.C.C. requirements of an enforceable contract for the sale of goods
over $500 because: (1) there was a writing which included a quantity
term; and (2) the contract was signed by the party against whom enforcement was sought (Wooldridge)." Furthermore, the court found the contract was accepted because the goods were received and used by Wooldridge
for a period of four weeks. 56
Wooldridge contended that the terms of payment in the original contract
were a condition precedent to his performance as a buyer.57 Marina, on
48. 102 N.M. 286, 694 P.2d 1351.
49. Id. at 287, 694 P.2d at 1352.
50. Id. at 287, 288, 694 P.2d at 1352, 1353.
51. id. at 288, 694 P.2d at 1353.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 292, 694 P.2d at 1357.
54. Id. at 287, 694 P.2d at 1352.
55. Id. at 289, 694 P.2d at 1354; N.M. STAT. ANN. §55-2-201(1) provides that a contract for
the sale of goods for the price of $500 or more is not enforceable by way of action or defense unless
there is some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has been made between the parties
and signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought.
56. ElephantButte Resort, 102 N.M. at 289, 694 P.2d at 1354; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-2-201(3)(c)
(contract which does not satisfy the requirements of subsection (I) but which is valid in other respects
is enforceable "with respect to goods ... which have been received and accepted)."
57. Elephant Butte Resort, 102 N.M. at 289, 694 P.2d at 1354.
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the other hand, argued that there was no condition precedent, but that
even if one did exist Wooldridge's actions constituted waiver and estoppel.58 The supreme court stated that a condition precedent is a conditional right which must be met before the contract is formed; however,
the waiver of an express contractual condition may be implied in the
conduct of the parties.59 While a contracting party may repudiate his
performance if the condition precedent is not met, Wooldridge by his
own conduct of accepting and using the boat formed the contract and
waived any argument as to the possibility of a remaining condition precedent to his performance as a buyer.' Therefore, he was estopped from
raising the issue of condition precedent. 6
On the issue of modification, the court held that once the existence of
a contract is established, it can be modified by the conduct of the parties
without written modification.62 Here, the court found that Wooldridge
agreed to the alternative financing, thus modifying the contract.6 3
When Wooldridge returned the boat, Marina did not attempt to sell it
during the seven months prior to trial.' Wooldridge asserted that even if
the contract was enforceable, he owed Marina no damages because Marina
could have sold the new boat and recovered its loss.65 Marina, however,
claimed that its damages resulted from the depreciation of the boat prior
to repudiation, and that those damages were caused by the change of
status from "new" to "used" goods.' The supreme court stated that the
non-defaulting party in a breach of contract situation has a duty to use
"'reasonable' diligence to mitigate damages." 67 Further, the court said,
New Mexico uses the "commercially reasonable" standard68 for resale
of goods. 69 Because there were no facts indicating that Marina should
have anticipated the breach prior to Wooldridge's letter of repudiation,
the duty to mitigate damages arose only after Marina was notified by
letter.70 Thus, Marina had a duty to mitigate only those damages that
58. Id. Wooldridge, by accepting and using the boat, formed the contract.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 290, 694 P.2d at 1355.
61. Id; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-1-103 provides that "the principles of law and equity, including...
estoppel .. .shall supplement [this Act's] provisions."
62. Elephant Butte Marina, 102 N.M. at 291, 694 P.2d at 1356. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-2-207(3)
provides that "conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a contract is sufficient to
establish a contract for sale although the writings do not otherwise establish a contract;" and § 552-209(4) provides that although an attempt at modification may fail because it is not written, it can
operate as a waiver.
63. Elephant Butte Marina, 102 N.M. at 291, 694 P.2d at 1356.
64. Id. at 292, 694 P.2d at 1357.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Deaton, Inc. v. Aeroglide Corp., 99 N.M. 253, 657 P.2d 109 (1982).
69. Elephant Butte Marina, 102 N.M. at 292, 694 P.2d at 1357.
70. Id.
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occurred after the letter. The loss in the value of the boat due to its "used"
condition occurred before the attempted repudiation letter.7 Therefore,
that loss in value was proper damage for the trial court to consider and
was not subject to the duty to mitigate.72
The trial court found that the difference in the market value of the boat
at the time of the contract and the time of repudiation and Marina's lost
profits and incidental damages such as storage and insurance for the boat
all constituted proper damages. 73 The supreme court affirmed this finding
as well as the trial court's calculations of damages.74
3. Rejection of Goods
In Oda Nursery, Inc. v. GarciaTree and Lawn, Inc.7", the New Mexico
Supreme Court dealt with rejection of goods under the U.C.C. Plaintiff
Oda sued defendant Garcia to recover the purchase price on a contract
for the sale to Garcia of 985 spreading juniper plants.7" Garcia counterclaimed for breach of contract, alleging that the plants were not of the
quality warranted. 77 Oda argued that Garcia's rejection of the plants was
ineffective and untimely.7 The supreme court reversed the trial court and
remanded the case for a determination of damages to be awarded to Oda.79
Garcia ordered the plants in early 1982, intending to use them in a
beautification project for the City of Albuquerque. ° When the plants
arrived in Albuquerque in March, 1982, they were inspected by Garcia,
and later they were inspected by the city.8 1 One of Garcia's employees
made a telephone call to Oda shortly after the plants arrived in Albuquerque to the effect that the plants did not look "up to snuff. ,82 However,
Garcia made a partial payment in June, 1982,83 nurtured the plants for
four months and planted them in July and August, 1982.' Over the next
several months, about 700 of the plants died. 5
The supreme court held that the agreement between Oda Nursery and
Garcia qualified as a contract for the sale of goods and, as such, was
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
103 N.M. 438, 708 P.2d 1039.
Id.at 439, 708 P.2d at 1040.

Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.at
Id.
ld. at
Id.

442, 708 P.2d at 1043.
439, 708 P.2d at 1040.
440, 708 P.2d at 1041.
439, 708 P.2d at 1040.
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governed by the provisions of the U.C.C."6 The court pointed out that
section 55-2-602(1)" 7 provides that "rejection of goods must be within a
reasonable time after their delivery or tender" and that rejection is not
effective unless the seller is notified according to section 55-1-201(26)." 8
Under section 55-2-605,"9 the court said, the notice must state a particular
defect which is ascertainable by reasonable inspection and failure to do
so precludes the buyer from relying on the unstated defect to justify
rejection or to establish breach." The court stated that the telephone call
by Garcia's employee was not sufficient notice of rejection and that the
acts of sending the check and planting the shrubs were inconsistent with
any intention to rescind. 91
B. Other Contract Issues
1. Limitation of Liability, Contracts of Adhesion, and
Unconscionability
Albuquerque Tire Company, Inc. v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Company,9 2 raised issues of limitation of liability and contract of
adhesion. Plaintiff Albuquerque Tire signed a contract with Mountain
States which provided for twelve different listings and advertisements to
appear in the directory under various headings and which limited Mountain States' liability for errors in the listings and advertisements to the
amount of the contract price. 93 Upon publication of the directory, Albuquerque Tire's telephone number appeared incorrectly in the largest of
the advertisements.' Mountain States eliminated the cost of that ad from
the bill, but Albuquerque Tire nevertheless sued for additional damages. 95
The trial court granted Mountain States' motion for summary judgment,
and Albuquerque Tire appealed, claiming that: (1) summary judgment
was error because a fact issue existed regarding whether the omission
resulted from gross negligence rather than ordinary negligence; (2) the
limitation of liability clause contained in the contract was against public
policy; and (3) the agreement was a contract of adhesion. 9' The supreme
court affirmed.
86. Id. at 440, 208 P.2d at 1041.
87. N.M. STAT. ANN. §55-2-602(I) (1978).
88. Id.at § 55-1-201(26) provides that: "[A] person notifies or gives a notice or notification to
another by taking such steps as may be reasonably required to inform the other in ordinary course
whether or not such other actually comes to know of it."
89. Id.at §55-2-605.
90. 103 N.M. at 440, 708 P.2d at 1041.
91. Id.at 441, 442, 708 P.2d at 1042, 1043.
92. 102 N.M. 445, 697 P.2d 128.
93. Id.at 446, 447, 697 P.2d at 129, 130.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.at 447, 697 P.2d at 130.
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First, the supreme court rejected the contention of a fact issue, stating
that Albuquerque Tire presented no facts in its support.97 Second, the
court rejected the public policy contention, stating that while a public
utility generally "cannot validly contract against its liability for negligence
in the performance of a duty of public service," 98 previous New Mexico
case law has held that yellow page advertising is not a part of Mountain
States' essential duty of providing telephone communication service, and
thus a public service duty was not involved in this case."
Finally, the court addressed the issue of whether the contract between
Albuquerque Tire and Mountain Bell was an adhesion contract and therefore unenforceable.'° A contract of adhesion, the court said, has been
defined as a standardized contract prepared entirely by one party for the
acceptance of the other which, due to the disparity in bargaining power
between the draftsman and the second party, must be accepted or rejected
by the second party on a "take it or leave it" basis, without opportunity
for bargaining.' 0 ' The supreme court found that Mountain States had been
awarded a monopoly of the yellow page market and that the contract with
Mountain States was a standardized contract prepared by it for acceptance
by Albuquerque Tire.'°2 Albuquerque Tire, if it wanted yellow page advertising, could not have avoided doing business with Mountain States.
However, the court held that Albuquerque Tire's claim of an adhesion
contract failed because there was no evidence that it did not have an
opportunity to negotiate the terms of the contract. 103
The element of a "take it or leave it" basis for the adhesion contract
must be demonstrated to the court. To demonstrate that no opportunity
for negotiation existed when the parties entered into the contract, the
practitioner may show that the form contract was the only one ever used
by the company, no opportunity arose for the parties to negotiate the
terms or negotiations for contrary terms were attempted and failed. "0
Guthmann v. La Vida Llena, 05 also dealt with a claim of contract of
adhesion as well as unconscionability. Plaintiff, the personal representative of the estate of Kathleen MacKay, sought a refund of the entrance
fee paid by Ms. MacKay to defendant La Vida Llena, alleging that the
agreement between the parties was unconscionable and an unenforceable
97. Id.
98. In re Rates and Charges of Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Company, 99 N.M. 1,
6, 653 P.2d 501, 506 (1982).
99. Albuquerque Tire, 102 N.M. at 447, 697 P.2d at 130.
100. Id. at 448, 697 P.2d at 131.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 448, 449, 697 P.2d at 131, 132. Both of these elements meet the definition of an
adhesion contract.
103. Id. at 449, 697 P.2d at 132.
104. Id. See supra text following note 114.
105. 103 N.M. 506, 709 P.2d 675.
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adhesion contract. " The trial court dismissed the complaint, and the New
Mexico Supreme Court affirmed.' 07
Ms. MacKay was 79 years old and had a life expectancy of seven to
nine years when she began looking for a retirement facility. 0' 8 After several
weeks of studying the residence agreement and visiting La Vida Liena
and several other "life care" retirement homes, she signed the agreement,
paid the $36,950 entrance fee and moved in. " Five months later she
became sick and died shortly thereafter."' The contract provided for a
monthly service fee of $537, several long-range services for the residents
and no refund of the entry2 fee. "' After her death, her personal representative sued for a refund."
On the allegation that the residence agreement was an unenforceable
adhesion contract, the supreme court delineated two steps to determine
whether an adhesion contract is unenforceable. "' First, the trial court
must decide whether the contract is one of adhesion, and, second, the
court 4must determine whether the contract or a provision thereof is unfair."
The court set forth three elements which it said must be satisfied before
an adhesion contract can be found:
1. The agreement must be in the form of a standard contract prepared
or adopted by one party for the acceptance by the other.
2. The party offering the standardized contract must enjoy a superior
bargaining position such that the weaker party virtually cannot avoid
doing business under the particular contract terms.
3. The contract must be offered to the weaker party on a take it or
leave it basis, without opportunity for bargaining." 5
The evidence showed that although the contract was a standard form,
Ms. MacKay had the choice of several retirement homes and knew she
did not have to sign the contract." 6 Thus, the supreme court held that
the requirements of an adhesion contract were not met. '17
Plaintiff also argued that the contract was unconscionable. The supreme
court stated that ". . . [i]f there has been 'an absence of meaningful
choice on the part of one of the parties (procedural unconscionability),
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
Ill.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id.at 508, 709 P.2d at 677.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 508, 509, 709 P.2d at 677, 678.
Id.
Id. at 509, 709 P.2d at 678.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the
unconscionability), a contract may be held to
other party,' (substantive
18
be unconscionable."'
The court explained that the lack of meaningful choice relates to a
procedural analysis of unconscionability and is determined by examining
the circumstances surrounding the contract formation, including the particular party's ability to understand the terms of the contract and the
relative bargaining power of the parties." 9 Plaintiff argued that no "meaningful choice" existed because (1) the only other local "life-care" center
that was acceptable to decedent had no immediate openings, (2) the
contract was presented on a standardized printed form on a take it or
leave it basis, and (3) defendant did not fully disclose the value of the
rights and services the deceased was to obtain under the contract. 2 The
court noted several factors to be considered in determining whether a
contract is procedurally unconscionable, including use of sharp practices
or high pressure techniques and the relative education, sophistication or
wealth of the parties, as well as the relative scarcity of the subject matter
of the contract. 12' The court noted that Ms. MacKay was not subjected
to high pressure tactics, read the contract in its entirety and fully understood the implications of all of its terms. 122 Furthermore, she had engaged
in extensive comparison shopping and had discussed the contract at length
with both the defendant's representative and a close friend.' 23 She also
had a lawyer available for consultation. 24 The court noted that Ms. MacKay
had a net worth exceeding $100,000 and a monthly income of $1,200. 125
This fact was relevant according to the court because consumers who
successfully assert unconscionability usually are poor or otherwise disadvantaged, and businessmen and middle class purchasers are not ordinarily victims of the kinds of gross "advantage-taking" that constitutes
concluded that the contract was not prounconscionability.126 The court
27
cedurally unconscionable.
On the issue of substantive unconscionability the court stated the rule
that a contract which does not violate public policy is not unconscionable
unless one or more of its terms are grossly unfair under the circumstances
as they existed at the time the contract was formed. 28 Noting that Ms.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 510, 709 P.2d at 679.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 511, 709 P.2d at 680.
Id.
Id.
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MacKay's death was totally unexpected, the court reviewed the trial
court's findings that the "no refund" entrance fee was part of its overall
financing plan, was comparable to the fees of similar facilities and could
not be refunded upon premature death without increasing fees for other
residents.' 29 Given the extensive services available (including guaranteed
nursing home care), the court compared the arrangement to an annuity
contract and held that Ms. MacKay assumed the risk of early death. "3
Overall, the supreme court found the arrangement fair.' 3
2. Rescission, Fraudulent Misrepresentation and Prejudgment
Interest.
In Ledbetter v. Webb, 31 2 the supreme court considered issues of rescission, fraudulent misrepresentation, comparative negligence and prejudgment interest. Ledbetter presents a breach of contract action brought
by the sellers of an ice cream business against the purchaser. Shortly after
the sale, the ice cream machines malfunctioned, causing the purchasers
to close the business.' 33 The purchasers defaulted on a promissory note
to the sellers and failed to pay the rent which was due under their assignment of lease. " Sellers sued the purchasers for breach of contract,
and the purchasers counterclaimed for fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation. 3' 5 The trial court found that the purchasers had breached the
contract, and that as a result the sellers were entitled to compensatory
and special damages on the contract.' 36 The trial court further found that
the sellers fraudulently misrepresented the condition of the ice cream
machines and offset part of the seller's damages by the amount of the
purchaser's compensatory, consequential and punitive damages suffered
as a result of the fraudulent misrepresentations.' 37 The New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed."13
The purchasers challenged the trial court's refusal to find that they
were entitled to rescission of the purchase contract.' 39 Recognizing that
misrepresentation of a material fact, even if innocently made, will entitle
the party who has justifiably relied thereon to rescind the contract, 40 the
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id.
Id.at 513, 709 P.2d at 682.
Id.
103 N.M. 597, 711 P.2d 874.
Id.at 599, 711 P.2d at 876.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 604, 711 P.2d at 881.
Id. at 605, 711 P.2d at 882.
Id. at 600, 601, 711 P.2d at 877, 878.
Id. at 600, 711 P.2d at 877.
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supreme court stated that rescission is an equitable remedy which seeks
to restore the status quo ante. 4' The aggrieved party must return or offer
to return that which has been received under the contract as a condition
precedent to maintaining a suit for rescission.' In this case, the record
indicated that the purchasers acted in such a way that it was impossible
to restore the status quo ante.' 43 Furthermore, the purchasers' conversion
of certain equipment on the premises deprived them of the "clean hands"
necessary to seek the equitable remedy of rescission.'
The sellers challenged the trial court's finding of fraudulent misrepresentation regarding the ice cream machines, arguing that purchasers did
not prove by clear and convincing evidence that the machine was defective
and that the sellers knew it was defective at the time of the sale.' 45 The
supreme court rejected this contention, pointing out that "facts and circumstances surrounding a transaction may provide clear and convincing
evidence of fraudulent intent," and found sufficient circumstantial evidence in the record to support the trial court's findings. " The court also
held that the purchasers were inexperienced in the use of these machines
and justifiably relied on the sellers' representations regarding the condition
of the machines. 47
'
In addition to the finding of fraudulent misrepresentation, the trial court
had found that the sellers negligently misrepresented the condition of the
machines.' 48 It accordingly apportioned the purchaser's consequential
damages on the basis of comparative negligence.' 49 The supreme court,
however, held that conduct amounting to fraud cannot also constitute
negligent misrepresentation nor can negligent misrepresentation somehow
be a "lesser included tort" within the greater tort of fraud.' ° The court
141. Status quo ante, the term used by the court; means the state of things before. BLACK'S LAW
1581 (4th ed. 1968).
142. Ledbetter, Id. at 601, 711 P.2d at 878.
143. Id.
144. Id. The unclean hands doctrine bars a plaintiff's claim when the plaintiff's improper conduct
is the source, or part of the source of his equitable claim. DOBBS, REMEDIES at 45-46 (1973).
145. Ledbener, 103 N.M. at 600, 711 P.2d at 877.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 602, 711 P.2d at 879.
148. Id. at 601, 711 P.2d at 878. Negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation cannot coexist on
the same facts. The very nature of the claims are inconsistent. Negligent misrepresentation requires
a false representation made by a person when there is no reasonable basis to believe the statement
is true. Fraudulent misrepresentation requires knowing and intentional misrepresention of the facts.
The burden of proof also differs; fraud requires clear and convincing proof, while negligent misrepresentations requires proof by a preponderance of the evidence.
149. Id. at 601, 711 P.2d at 878.
150. Id. at 603, 711 P.2d at 880. However, the court determined that the trial court's erroneous
conclusion of law must be reconciled if possible to sustain the judgment. The court determined there
was substantial evidence to justify the fraudulent misrepresentation. Denying the existence of negligent misrepresentation did not overturn the lower court's judgment. Id.
DICTIONARY
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further stated that the allocation of a portion of purchasers' damages to
themselves should have been characterized as a reduction for failure to
mitigate rather than comparative negligence. 5 '
The promissory note signed by purchasers provided for interest from
the date of default, but the trial court refused to award interest to the
sellers.' 5 2 The supreme court affirmed, stating that while interest is normally allowed on a contract to pay a definite sum of money from the
time performance was due, such interest is not to be awarded arbitrarily
without regard for the equities of each particular situation. 53 In this case,
the sellers' wrongful acts of misrepresentation provided sufficient ground
for the trial court to deny pre-judgment interest.154
The supreme court also discussed pre-judgment interest in Grynberg
v. Roberts.'55 Plaintiff and defendants entered into a contract in which
each defendant agreed to pay a certain percentage of the operating costs
of a well-drilling operation.' 6 The defendants failed to pay these costs
for several years.' 57 The trial court granted judgment to the plaintiff on
the principal indebtedness but failed to award the requested interest on
the principal awarded.' 8 Plaintiff appealed, relying on section 56-8-3' 59
which allows interest on indebtedness where the amount due can be readily
ascertained. Citing both the Restatement of Contracts" 6 and Shaeffer v.
Kelton, 6 ' the supreme court held that in this case the plaintiff was able
to show that the debt was "ascertainable by mathematical calculation
from a standard fixed in the contract" and allowed interest on the amount
of the debt.'6 2 The court also held that the rate of pre-judgment interest
to be granted is that rate in effect "when this became a pending case. "'63
1I. REAL ESTATE
A. Real Estate Contracts
1. Forfeiture
The New Mexico Supreme Court dealt with two real estate contract
forfeiture cases. In both cases, the court refused to find wrongful forfeiture.
151. Id. at 603, 711 P.2d at 880.
152. Id.at 604, 711 P.2d at 881.
153. Id.at 605, 711 P.2d at 882.
154. Id.
155. 102 N.M. 560, 698 P.2d 430 (1985).
156. Id. at 561, 698 P.2d at 431.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 56-8-3 (Cum. Supp. 1984).
160. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 337 (1932).
161. 95 N.M. 182, 619 P.2d 1226 (1980) (where amount of indebtedness under contract was
ascertainable to breaching party, injured party had a right to interest at the legal rate on amount
due).
162. Grynberg, 102 N.M. at 563, 698 P.2d at 433.
163. Id.
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In Jacobs v. Phillippi, " plaintiffs signed a real estate contract to purchase a residence from defendants. The negotiations were carried out
through a real estate agent.' 65 The purchasers had initially offered an
interest rate of ten percent. " The sellers then made a counteroffer through
' The purchasers
the agent raising the interest rate to twelve percent. 67
made a further counteroffer of ten percent for the first six months and
twelve percent for the second six months.' 68 The agent did not inform
the sellers of the further counteroffer, however, and the sellers believed
that their offer of twelve percent interest had been accepted. 169 Both parties
then signed the real estate contract which provided for an interest rate of
' The purchasers
twelve percent and a balloon payment within one year. 70
failed to pay the balloon payment, and the sellers declared the purchasers
in default under the real estate contract and withdrew the special warranty
deed from escrow and filed it.' 7' The purchasers sued for rescission of
the real estate contract with a return of their down payment and for
damages against the real estate agent.' 72 The trial court dismissed the
purchasers' complaint and they appealed.'
The supreme court affirmed. '4 The purchasers first contended that the
trial court erred in concluding that they suffered no damage as a result
of the agent's breach of fiduciary duty.'75 The supreme court held that
there was substantial evidence to support the trial court's finding that the
agent had breached his duty, but that the interest rates were not a material
between the parties and in the execution of the
factor in the negotiations
76
real estate contract. 1
The supreme court also discussed the purchasers' contention of unwarranted forfeiture, stating that in New Mexico the rule is well settled
that real estate contracts are enforceable, unless enforcement of the literal
terms would result in an unwarranted forfeiture or in unfairness which
shocks the conscience of the court. 177 The court further stated that the
exceptions to enforcement of default provisions involve equitable con164. 102 N.M. 449, 697 P.2d 132 (1985).
165. Id. at 450, 697 P.2d at 133.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 451, 697 P.2d at 134. The agent's breach of fiduciary duty consisted of not telling
the seller of the buyer's counteroffer of 10% interest on the real estate contract. The executed contract
contained the originally proposed 12% interest rate.
176. Id. The buyer never paid the higher interest rate because the balloon payment was not paid.
Consequently, the buyer never suffered damage from paying a higher interest rate due to the agent's
breach of fiduciary duty.
177. Id.
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siderations which have been addressed in several New Mexico cases.,"
The court said that those considerations did not79exist in this case and thus
no exception to enforcement was applicable.
Finally, the purchasers asserted that the real estate contract was void
due to a mutual mistake which resulted in no meeting of the minds between
the parties. ' The court rejected this contention, saying a contract is void
because of a mutual mistake only where the minds of the parties have
not met on any part of the contract.'' However, in this case, evidence
existed supporting the trial court's conclusions that the purchasers' belief
that the interest rate was ten percent for the first six months was a unilateral
mistake. 2 The contract stated the sellers' belief that the interest rate of
twelve percent was the rate agreed to by the parties. 183 Only the purchasers
believed that the interest rate should have been ten percent for the first
six months. 8 4 The courts will refuse to void a contract for unilateral
mistake except where the mistake is basic and material to the agreement
and the other party knew or reasonably should have known of the mistake. 5
Russell v. Richards"6 was another case where the trial court was called
upon to judge whether forfeiture of a real estate contract "shocks the
conscience." Here, Russell had purchased the property by paying the
original purchaser an $11,000 down payment and assuming the original
purchaser's contract balance of $38,000. I"7 After paying about $10,800
on the principal balance, she defaulted and the original seller effected a
forfeiture.' Russell sued for damages. The trial court held the forfeiture
to be unwarranted and awarded damages equal to the total of her down
payment, her principal payments and the increase in the value of the
house over the period she held it."8 9 The original sellers (Richards) appealed, and the supreme court reversed (in part), holding the forfeiture
to be valid and eliminating the real estate contract damages."9
178. Id. When enforcement of the literal terms would result in an unwarranted forfeiture or in
unfairness which shocks the conscience of the court, then the court may refuse to enforce the
contract's default provisions. Huckins v. Ritter, 99 N.M. 560, 661 P.2d 52 (1983); Hale v. Whitlock,
92 N.M. 657, 593 P.2d 754 (1979); Elfeile v. Toppino, 90 N.M. 469, 565 P.2d 340 (1977). See
supra text following note 190.
179. Jacobs, 102 N.M. at 451, 697 P.2d at 134.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. 103 N.M. 48, 702 P.2d 993 (1985).
187. Id. at 50, 702 P.2d at 995.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 51, 702 P.2d at 996.
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The court listed the equitable considerations applicable in determining
whether a forfeiture shocks the conscience of the court; namely, the
amount of money already paid by the buyer to the seller, the period of
possession of the real property by the buyer, the market value of the real
property at the time of default compared to the original sales price, and
the rental potential and the value of the real property. 9 ' The court then
held that the trial court erred in considering the down payment because
the Richards had not received it.' 92 The court also stated that the trial
court should not have considered the increased market value of the real
property, citing cases'93 to the effect that the purchaser (Russell) bears
the risk of loss or any enhancement in value."
2. Assignment
In PaperchasePartnershipv. Bruckner,195 the supreme court interpreted
the clause found in most New Mexico real estate contracts prohibiting
assignment without consent. Plaintiff Paperchase sold an apartment complex to the Bruckners under a real estate contract which contained the
standard non-assignment clause. "9Two years later the Bruckners transferred their interest in the property to A & 0 Investments who then
subsequently transferred its interest to another party. 19 Neither of these
transfers was with the consent or approval of Paperchase. 98
' All payments
due under the original contract were made in a timely manner. 9 Paperchase claimed that because the subsequent transfers violated the nonassignment clause, the Bruckners were in default under the contract.2
The trial court ruled that the later transfers were not assignments and
granted summary judgment in favor of the Bruckners. 2 '
The supreme court affirmed, stating that according to the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts, 2 unless a contrary intention appears from the
language or the circumstances, an assignment of contract is both an
assignment of the assignor's rights and a delegation of his duties.2 3 A
191. Id.
192. Id. at 51, 702 P.2d at 996. The down payment was received by the Richards' assignors.
The court reasoned that the Richards could not be forced to repay money they had not received.
193. See, e.g., M.G.I.C. Mortgage Corp. v. Bowen, 91 N.M. 200, 202, 572 P.2d 547, 549
(1977).
194. Russell, 103 N.M. at 51, 702 P.2d at 996.
195. 102 N.M.221, 693 P.2d 587 (1985).
196. Id. at 222, 693 P.2d at 588.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 328 (1979).
203. Paperchase, 102 N.M. at 223, 693 P.2d at 589.
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provision prohibiting assignment in the contract bars only the delegation
of duties, and if there is no delegation of duties there is generally no
violation of the prohibition on assignment. 2" Because the subsequent
transfers had no effect on the duties of the parties to the original contract,
the Bruckners were still liable for the installment payments and Paperchase could not require return of the property or acceleration of the balance
due in the absence of default.2" 5 Thus, the court held, the assignment
prohibition was not violated.2"
3. Failure to Maintain Insurance
In Boatwright v. Howard,2 "7 the New Mexico Supreme Court dealt
with a real estate contract purchaser's failure to maintain insurance on
the contract property. The plaintiffs sold property to the defendants under
a real estate contract.20" The Boatwrights alleged that the Howards had
failed to maintain the insurance on the property as specified in the contract
and had destroyed certain improvements. 2' As a result of these actions,
the Boatwrights sought to accelerate the balance due, and when that
demand was not met they brought suit to terminate the Howards' rights
under the contract and to regain possession of the property.2" ' The district
court granted summary judgment, holding that the Howards' actions did
not constitute a default under the contract and that therefore the Boatwrights could not regain possession. 21 '
On appeal, the supreme court affirmed. 2" 2 The Boatwrights asserted
that paragraph six of the real estate contract, requiring that the purchaser
pay all "taxes, assessments, or other charges against the real estate"
and allowing a forfeiture of the purchaser's right to the real estate if such
charges are not paid entitled them to regain possession.2"3 The court held
that the term "charges against the real estate" meant only those charges
which if not paid could become liens or affect title to the real estate, and
that insurance was not such a charge.2" 4
The Boatwrights also contended that a security agreement entered into
by the parties four months after the real estate contract helped clarify
what the parties intended to constitute default under the real estate con204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

Id.
Id. at 223, 693 P.2d at 589.
Id. at 223, 224, 693 P.2d at 589, 590.
102 N.M.262, 694 P.2d 518 (1985).
Id. at 264, 694 P.2d at 520.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 265, 694 P.2d at 521.
Id. at 264, 694 P.2d at 520.
Id. at 265, 694 P.2d at 521.
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tract.2" 5 The court disregarded the security agreement, stating that the real
estate contract was unambiguous and found no evidence that the parties
intended for the real estate contract and the security agreement to merge
or for the default provisions in the security216agreement to replace the
default provisions in the real estate contract.
4. Prepayment Penalty
Naumburg v. Pattison,2 7 addressed the applicability of the Residential
Home Loan Act 218 to a prepayment prohibition in a real estate contract
covering a "recreational second-home." The Act forbids a lender from
requiring a penalty or premium for the prepayment of the balance of an
indebtedness on a residence.21 9 Plaintiffs purchased a lot with a log cabin
pursuant to a real estate contract containing a complete prepayment prohibition. 22' After attempting to prepay the contract, they brought suit
against the sellers to have the prohibition declared invalid, for damages
for failure to accept prepayment and to have defendants forfeit all interest,
22' The trial court denied
charges and other advantages of sale.222
relief on
apply.
not
the ground that the Act did
After stating that the Act's restriction applies to real estate contracts
made for the purchase of a "residence", the supreme court reversed,
holding that although the structure was located in a commercial area and
was a second home used primarily for recreational purposes the Act
nevertheless applied to the purchase. 223 The court further found that a
complete prohibition against prepayment is a penalty of the most extreme
kind and therefore forbidden by the Act.224
The court also discussed what constitutes the tender of prepayment.225
The purchasers had, by letter to the sellers, stated an intention to prepay
the real estate contract and asserted that the letter was a sufficient tender
because the purchasers were ready, willing and able to make full payment. 226 Alternatively, the purchasers argued that even if the letter was
not a sufficient tender, a formal tender was not required since the sellers
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. 103 N.M. 649, 711 P.2d 1387 (1985).
218. N.M. STAT. ANN. § §56-8-22 to -30 (Cum. Supp. 1982).
219. Id.at §56-8-30.
220. Naumburg, 103 N.M. at 651, 711 P.2d at 1389.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.at 652, 711 P.2d at 1390.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 653, 711 P.2d at 1391. The plaintiffs sued arguing that the defendant refused to accept
prepayment on a real estate contract. Since the court found no valid tender at prepayment occurred,
plaintiffs were not entitled to damages for defendant's refusal to accept the prepayment.
226. Id.
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rejected the purchasers' offer to prepay.27 The court stated that common
law rules define tender as more than a mere offer to pay.228 It must be an
offer to perform coupled with the present ability of immediate performance so that were it not for the refusal or cooperation by the party to
whom the tender is made, the condition or obligation would be immediately satisfied.229 The purchasers' letter stated that the purchasers would
shortly pay the outstanding balance.23 The court held that this was clearly
not an offer to pay coupled with the actual production of the amount
owing." 3' Rather, it was an offer to pay the balance at some uncertain
time in the near future and was therefore not a proper tender.232
B. Real Estate Brokers
Clodfelter v. Plaza, Ltd.233 presents a classic set of facts entitling a
real estate broker to collect his full commission even though the property
was sold by another broker. The original broker, Clodfelter, signed an
agreement with the defendants which contained an "exclusive right to
sell provision" but which also contained language allowing the defendants
to sell the property themselves.234 Several months later, without revoking
the first agreement, the defendants signed another agreement with a new
broker, and the new broker obtained a contract for sale.235 Two weeks
later, without disclosing the new listing agreement, the defendants obtained an agreement from Clodfelter that he was not entitled to a commission if the property was sold solely through the efforts of the owners."'
The trial court awarded Clodfelter his full commission.237
The supreme court affirmed the trial court, holding that the original
agreement was valid and was breached by defendant.23 The court first
recited that there are two types of exclusive listing agreements commonly
in use, the "exclusive agency" agreement and the "exclusive right to
sell" agreement.2 39 An exclusive agency agreement "prohibits an owner
from selling the property through another broker during the listing period,
but allows the owner to sell his property through his own efforts." 2 In
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
102 N.M. 544, 698 P.2d 1(1985).
Id. at 545, 698 P.2d at 2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 546, 698 P.2d at 3.
Id.
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comparison, the exclusive right to sell agreement precludes the sale of
property by anyone other than the broker, including the owner, thus
protecting the broker from any sale other than the one he arranges.24 "In
the instant case, the parties agreed to an exclusive right to sell provision,
but by modifying the agreement to allow the Owners to sell their property,
they created an exclusive agency contract." 242 Because defendants sold
their property through another broker, the court said they breached the
original contract with Clodfelter.243
Noting that defendant made no effort to revoke prior to the sale, the
supreme court stated that Clodfelter's efforts constituted sufficient partial
performance to preclude revocation at will.2 Clodfelter was not required
to tender a willing buyer in order to recover his full commission.24 5
C. Other Real Estate Issues
Clovis National Bank v. Harmon2 is an unusual case which concerns
several notes and mortgages signed by defendant in favor of Clovis National Bank ("CNB"). In July, 1974, Harmon gave the bank a real estate
mortgage securing existing and future indebtedness.24 In December, 1974,
Harmon signed a promissory note to the bank which Ken White endorsed
on behalf of Whiteway Cattle Company, Inc.24 In January, 1975, Harmon
signed another promissory note and in January, 1976, gave the bank
another mortgage to secure past, present and future debts.249 In December,
1981, Harmon signed an additional promissory note. Although the bank
made repeated demands for payment, none of the notes were paid.25 The
bank filed suit against the Harmons, White and Whiteway on the 1974
note and against the Harmons and others on the 1975 and 1981 notes."
CNB also
sought foreclosure of the 1974 and 1976 real estate mort252
gages.
The trial court granted judgment in favor of the bank on all counts
against all parties including the endorsers, but held that the 1974 note
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 547, 698 P.2d at 4.
244. Id. at 548, 698 P.2d at 5. See White v. Ragel, 82 N.M. 644, 647, 485 P.2d 978, 981 (Ct.
App. 1971) (The exclusive agency provision precludes (seller) from employing another broker. The
exclusive right to sell protects (broker's) real estate commission upon any sale by anyone. Broker's
partial performance established a binding contract.)
245. Clodfelter, 102 N.M. at 548, 698 P.2d at 5.
246. 102 N.M. 166, 692 P.2d 1315 (1985).
247. Id. at 168, 692 P.2d at 1317.
248. Id. Ken White's relationship to Harmon is not identified.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17

(endorsed by White and Whiteway) should be satisfied proratably with
the other notes out of the foreclosure proceeds.253 The bank appealed the
finding that the 1974 note was to be satisfied out of the foreclosure
proceeds.2 " Although the opinion does not say so, the bank undoubtedly
wanted to collect on the 1974 note directly from White and Whiteway
without having to apply the foreclosure proceeds.
The supreme court affirmed.255 Because the provisions of both mortgages clearly expressed an intent that they secure all Hannon's debts,
should be
the 1974 endorsed note was secured by the mortgages and 256
property.
mortgaged
the
of
sale
the
of
out
proratably
satisfied
Based on language in one or more of the promissory notes, the trial
court awarded the bank attorney fees of 10% of the total judgment but
gave no indication of why this amount was reasonable.257 The supreme
court, citing previous New Mexico cases determining that mortgage provisions on attorney fees are subject to scrutiny and will be reduced where
uncertain or unreasonable, 258 remanded the case for a hearing on a reasonable amount to be awarded for attorney fees. 2 9
In F & S Company, Inc. v. Gentry,2" plaintiff F & S sought to foreclose
a judgment lien against two parcels of real estate allegedly owned by
26 1
Gentry. Finding that Gentry had no interest in the subject realty, the
262
trial court denied the foreclosure.
263
Gentry had originally acquired the realty as a co-tenant with Burch.
2" Gentry and Burch subThis deed was recorded in the clerk's office.
to the
sequently formed a limited partnership and conveyed the 2property
65
partnership, but they did not record that deed of transfer.
6
On appeal, F & S argued that sections 14-9-1 and 14-9-3" require
that all deeds and mortgages must be recorded in the county clerk's office
in order to affect the title or rights to real estate of any judgment lien
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 169, 692 P.2d at 1318.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 170, 692 P.2d at 1320. Attorney fees when awarded pursuant to a contract must be
reasonable in value and shall not exceed an amount stipulated in the contract. Budagher v. Sunnyland
Enterprises, 90 N.M. 365, 563 P.2d 1158 (1977).
258. Budagher, 90 N.M. 365, 563 P.2d 1158; Robison v. Katz, 94 N.M. 314, 610 P.2d 201 (Ct.
App.), cert. denied, 94 N.M. 675, 615 P.2d 992 (1980).
259. Clovis Nat'l Bank, 102 N.M. at 170, 692 P.2d at 1320.
260. 103 N.M. 54, 702 P.2d 999 (1985).
261. N.M. STAT. ANN. § § 39-4-2, 39-4-13 (1978) permits foreclosure on realty in which the
debtor has an interest. Both equitable and legal interests are covered by the act.
262. F & S, 103 N.M. at 54, 702 P.2d at 999.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-9-1 to -3 (1978).
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creditor. Gentry argued that even though the deed from Gentry to the
partnership was not recorded, the plaintiffs nevertheless had constructive
knowledge from the certificate of limited partnership that was filed in the
miscellaneous records.2 67 The supreme court held that F & S had a duty
to search the miscellaneous records, but under these circumstances the
partnership certificate was not sufficient to give notice of Gentry's transfer
of the interest in the property. The court noted that certificates of partnership are recorded under the partnership name, and although Gentry
was a general partner of the partnership his name did not appear anywhere
in the index notation for that certificate. 268 Furthermore, the certificate of
limited partnership would also fail as notice of the transfer because it
was not acknowledged and thus could not be treated as a recorded instrument. 269 Therefore, F & S was entitled to rely on the county records
indicating Gentry's continuing interest in the real estate, and the supreme
court remanded the case to the district court for an order foreclosing
F & S's judgment lien against the real estate to the extent of Gentry's
interest. 270
II1. INSURANCE
During the survey period, the New Mexico Supreme Court dealt with
three cases requiring interpretation of coverage language in insurance
policies. One case addressed wrongful payment of proceeds.
In Vihstad v. The Travelers Insurance Company,27' plaintiff was the
mother of a 14-year-old girl who deliberately ingested fifty aspirins in an
attempt to commit suicide or to scare her mother. An insurance claim
was filed to recover medical expenses and the claim was denied.272 The
issue was the interpretation of the policy term covering "accidental injury
or sickness".273 The supreme court, stating that absent any provision in
the policy defining "accidental" as something different from what is
understood by the general public, held that words in a policy will be
given their ordinary meaning.7 The case law has interpreted "accidental"
as an event occurring without design or purpose or unintentionally on the
part of the insured.275 In this case, the daughter deliberately and inten267. F & S, 103 N.M. at 55, 702 P.2d at 1000.
268. ld.
269. Id. at 56, 702 P.2d at 1001. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-8-4 (Cum. Supp. 1984).
270. F & S, 103 N.M. at 55, 702 P.2d at 1000.
271. 103 N.M. 465, 709 P.2d 187 (1985).
272. Id. at 466, 709 P.2d at 188.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id.; Webb v. New Mexico Publishing Co., 84 N.M. 550, 505 P.2d 1226 (1973); King v.
Traveler's Insurance Co., 47 N.M. 279, 284, 141 P.2d 333, 336 (1943).
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tionally ingested the aspirin. Therefore, the court said, her injury was
not the result of an accident as meant in the policy.276
In Weldon v. Commercial Union Assurance Company,277 defendant issued a hazard insurance policy to plaintiff for coverage on his motor
lodge. Section 1 of the policy defined covered property, and section 2
listed the property excluded from coverage.278 Subsequent to the issuance
of the policy, a leak developed in the underground gas pipeline to the
lodge, causing damages for interruption of business.279 Plaintiff filed a
claim under the insurance policy. The defendant denied coverage because
section 2 of the policy excluded coverage of underground pipes. 28 ° However, section 1 of the policy referred to coverage of all fixtures constituting
a permanent part and pertaining to the service of the building. 28 ' The trial
court entered judgment in favor of the insured, ruling that the policy was
ambiguous and must be construed so as to sustain coverage.282 The supreme court reversed, holding that the policy must be considered as a
whole, and that the specific provisions of Section 2 relating to underground pipes governed as against the general provisions of Section 1.283
In United Nuclear Corp. v. Allendale Mutual Insurance Co. ,284 plaintiff
United Nuclear Corporation ("UNC") sought reimbursement for business
interruption and property damage losses that occurred when a tailings
embankment failed at UNC's Churchrock uranium millsite. UNC brought
suit under two different insurance policies against defendant Allendale
Mutual Insurance Company ("Allendale") and its subsidiary Appalachian
Insurance Company ("Appalachian"). 285 The trial court found in favor
of Appalachian but found coverage under Allendale's policy, awarding
judgment to UNC for losses and damages, including attorneys fees, prejudgment interest and punitive damages.286 On appeal, the supreme court
discussed those issues, affirming in part and reversing in part.287
Allendale's insurance policy provided coverage for "collapse of buildings, structures or a material part thereof" and excluded from coverage
"subsidence or any other earth movement.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.

' 288

F_& S,103 N.M. at 467, 709 P.2d at 189.
103 N.M. 522, 710 P.2d 89 (1985).
Id. at 523, 710 P.2d at 90.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 524, 710 P.2d at 91.
103 N.M. 480, 709 P.2d 649 (1985).
Id. at 482, 709 P.2d at 651.
Id.
Id.
Id. Subsidence means falling, lowering or flattening out.

TIONAL DICTIONARY (1976).

The policy also stated

WEBSTER'S, THIRD NEW INTERNA-
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"collapse shall not mean settling ...

."289 Allendale's refusal to honor

UNC's claim for coverage was based in part on the ground that the dam
failure was excluded under the "subsidence or any other earth movement"
exception. 2" All parties agreed that the "collapse" was caused by "differential settlement. "29 Allendale claimed that differential settlement was
a kind of "subsidence."292 UNC argued, however, that according to Allendale's own written guidelines, even though "settling"is specifically
excluded, when settling is accompanied by or results in physical deterioration and material impairment of the structure, there is coverage under
the policy.293 The supreme court upheld the trial court's finding that the
"differential settlement" which caused the collapse at the mill site was
not a form of "subsidence" that would have been excluded under the
policy."
Alternatively, Allendale argued that if coverage was not excluded under
the "subsidence" exception, loss by "differential settlement" must be
excluded as "any other earth movement. 2 95 However, "earth movement"
had been defined in several previous cases,' and the supreme court
rejected Allendale's argument, stating that terms used in a policy which
have by prior judicial decisions been given a definite meaning will be
regarded as being used in view of such established construction and be
governed thereby; and if the insurer continues to issue policies containing
clauses which have been judicially construed, it will be considered as
issuing them with the established construction placed on them, even
though the construction violates the literal sense of the words used." In
this case the court found that earlier courts had interpreted "earth movement" to apply only to naturally occurring phenomena prior to the execution of the policy.2 98 Thus, the exclusion in the Allendale insurance
policy did not apply to the tailings embankment spill at the mill site. 299
Allendale also argued that the award of punitive damages was unlawful
and unconstitutional because Allendale had a reasonable basis for denying
289. United Nuclear, 103 N.M. at 482, 709 P.2d at 651.
290. Id.
291. Id. The meaning of differential settlement was a key issue in the case. If it means subsidence
then there was no coverage. However, if it means settling which results in damage to the structure
then there is coverage.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 483, 709 P.2d at 652.
294. Id. at 484, 709 P.2d at 653.
295. Id. at 483, 709 P.2d at 652.
296. See, e.g., Peach State Uniform Serv., Inc. v. Am. Ins. Co., 507 F.2d 996 (5th Cir. 1975).
Gullett v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 446 F.2d i100 (7th Cir. 1971); Wyatt v. Northwestern
Mutual Ins. Co., 304 F. Supp. 781 (D. Minn. 1969).
297. United Nuclear, 103 N.M. at 484, 709 P.2d at 653.
298. Id.
299. Id.
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coverage. 3" Allendale further argued that the standard of proof to deter3
mine punitive damages should be a clear and convincing standard. "' The
supreme court held the standard of proof for punitive damages is in
accordance with the general rule, not only in New Mexico but elsewhere,
that issues of fact in civil cases are to be determined by a preponderance
30 2
of the evidence and not by clear and convincing evidence. However,
the court determined that the trial court's award of $25,000,000 in punitive
damages was erroneous because the very substantial difference in the
amount claimed and the amount awarded showed that Allendale had3 °a3
legitimate reason to question the amount of damages claimed by UNC.
Futhermore, the court said that there were legitimate issues under the
various policy provisions regarding UNC's claim for loss in operating
3
profits, extraordinary costs, carrying costs and costs of repairs. "
In awarding attorneys fees, the trial court employed a "lode star"
figure, using the number of hours worked by UNC's legal counsel and
30 5
multiplying that number by the attorney's billing rate. The "lode star"
figure was then increased by a multiplier of three which represented, in
the trial court's view, a proper enhancement for the exceptional success
of UNC's attorneys in prosecution of this suit.33 6 The supreme court,
however, determined that Allendale was not unreasonable in failing to
pay UNC's claimed damages under the policy and therefore reversed the
trial court's award of attorneys fees.30 7 The supreme court also said that
"lode star" and multiplier methods of determining awards of attorneys
fees have generally been applied only in civil rights cases and class action
suits and were inappropriate in this case.30 8
On the issue of pre-judgment interest, Allendale argued that the trial
court erred in awarding interest from the date of Allendale's denial of
UNC's claim to the date of judgment because the compensatory damage
amount was neither liquidated nor ascertainable as of the date of denial."
The supreme court affirmed the award. The court recited the established
300. Id. Insurance companies may deny coverage when they have a good faith belief that no
coverage exists. A policy of insurance is simply a contract between the insurer and the insured. The
obligation which arises from the contract is that both the insured and insurer will deal fairly and
honestly with one another. See, e.g., Modisette v. Found. Reserve Ins. Co., 77 N.M. 661, 427 P.2d
21 (1967).
301. 103 N.M. at 484, 709 P.2d at 653; Travelers Indem. Co. v. Armstrong, 442 N.E.2d 349
(Ind. App. 1982); Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 294 N.W.2d 437 (1980).
302. United Nuclear, 103 N.M. at 485, 709 P.2d at 654.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 486, 709 P.2d at 655.
306. Id.

307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 488, 709 P.2d at 657.
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247

law that, where the amount is ascertainable, pre-judgment interest may
be awarded at the judge's discretion.3 t The court stated that, although
the amount payable to UNC under Allendale's policy was not finally
settled until judgment, "mere difference of opinion as to the amount is
no more reason to excuse defendant from interest than difference of
opinion whether
he legally ought to pay it off, which has never been held
31
an excuse." 1
Bozza v. GeneralAdjustment Bureau,3" 2 involved a suit by an insured
corporation and one of its shareholders against the corporation's insurance
company and its claims adjuster claiming improper payment of insurance
proceeds. The trial court granted summary judgment for the insurance
company, finding that it had no duty to the shareholder and that any duty
owing to3 the insured was fulfilled by the insurance company as a matter
31
of law.
The plaintiff corporation, of which the Bozzas and the Ruzzos were
shareholders, purchased a truck and insured it with defendant insurance
company. 3" The truck was stolen, proof of loss by the corporation was
filed and the adjuster issued two drafts made payable to the corporation
in settlement of the claim.3" 5 Ruzzo endorsed the drafts on behalf of the
corporation, cashed the checks and absconded with the money. 3 6 Bozza
stated in affidavits that he notified the adjuster of his suspicion that Ruzzo
would abscond with the insurance money and requested that Bozza be
notified when the drafts were ready to be picked up.317 The corporation's
attorney affied that he notified the insurance company that the insurance
proceeds were to be paid through his office. 31 8
The court of appeals affirmed the summary judgment dismissing the
shareholder's claim, saying he was not a party to the insurance contract.3 9
On the issue of liability to the insured corporation, the insurance company
argued that Ruzzo had the apparent authority to act on behalf of and to
bind the corporation.3 20 The Bozzas argued that the insurance company
had notice and knowledge of the limitations on Ruzzo's authority or
possessed information which required them to make further inquiry before
delivering the drafts to Ruzzo. 32 ' The court of appeals agreed that this
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.

Id.
Id.
103 N.M. 200,
Id. at 201, 704
Id. at 202, 704
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 203, 704

704 P.2d 454 (Ct. App. 1985).
P.2d at 455.
P.2d at 456.

P.2d at 457.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17

issue raised a factual question as to whether the insurance company could
322
rely on Ruzzo's apparent authority and reversed the summary judgment.
IV. BANKING
323
Landrum v. Security National Bank of Roswell, deals with the issue
of whether the "adverse claims" statute applies to a bank's dishonoring
324
of checks based upon forged endorsement claims. Plaintiff deposited
several checks on which he was one of several payees into his account
at Security National Bank of Roswell.325 Six months later, after receiving
affidavits from the other payees stating that plaintiff had forged the endorsements, the bank put a "hold" on the account and refused to honor
checks which were presented during the period of the "hold" .326 The
affidavits proved to be false, and plaintiff sued the bank for wrongful
dishonor, relying on section 58-1-7.327 That section deems ineffective a
claim against a deposit unless the adverse claimant "supplies indemnity
deemed adequate by the bank or the bank is served with process or order
issued by a court of competent jurisdiction in an action in which the
adverse claimant and the person or persons nominally entitled to the
deposit are parties . . . ""' The bank argued that the statute did not
supplant the common law allowing the bank upon proper notice to hold
the deposit a sufficient length of time to afford the claimant an opportunity
to assert his claim.329
The trial court ruled that there was wrongful dishonor as a matter of
law.33 The New Mexico Court of Appeals recognized that the statute
modifies the common law, but nevertheless found that it did not apply
to the forged endorsement claim.' The court reasoned that the payees
were not making an adverse claim to the deposit but rather were claiming
332
liability on the part of the bank for conversion. Therefore, upon proper
bank could properly place
the
notice of the forged endorsement claims,
order to inquire into the
in
a "hold" on plaintiff's checking account
33 The bank's liability for wrongful dishonor would depend upon
claims.
reasonableness of both its inquiry into the claims and the length of the
hold, both questions of fact.334 The judgment of the trial court was reversed
and the cause remanded for a new trial."'

V. PARTNERSHIPS
Benton v. Albuquerque National Bank,336 presents a wealth of law on
322. Id. at204, 704 P.2d at 458.
323. 104 N.M. 55, 716 P.2d 246 (Ct.App. 1985), cert. quashed, 103 N.M. 798, 715 P.2d 71
(1986).
324. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-1-7 (1978).
325. Landrum, 104 N.M. at56, 716 P.2d at247.
326. Id.
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assignment of partnership interests. Plaintiff's father had entered into a
partnership with his future wife (defendant's predecessor in interest) and
then assigned his partnership interest to plaintiff.337 Subsequently, the
father purported to quitclaim his interest in the partnership real estate to
the wife, and she then sold the real estate to defendants.338 Prior to the
sale, plaintiff recorded the father's assignment in the county records.339
The trial court found that the assignment was ineffective as an invalid
testamentary transfer and that waiver, laches and estoppel barred plaintiff's claim in any event.'1 °
The New Mexico Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for new
trial, holding that the father's assignment of his partnership interest was
valid and divested him of his partnership interest.34 ' The court said that
because a partnership must consist of at least two parties, the assignment
effectively dissolved the partnership, and the remaining partner should
have wound up the partnership's affairs and given plaintiff his due portion
of the partnership property and assets." The court of appeals held that
upon new trial, the lower court should redetermine if plaintiff's claim
was defeated by waiver, laches or estoppel. 3 The opinion does not
address the validity of the sale of partnership assets to defendants.
327. Id. Plaintiff's argument is as follows: Under N.M. Stat. Ann. §55-4-402 (1978) the bank
is liable for damages proximately caused by wrongful dishonor; however, wrongful dishonor does
not include any permitted or justified dishonor. The Adverse Claim statute, §58-1-7, permits the
dishonoring of checks by following specified procedures. The bank, however, withheld payment on
the basis of forged endorsement claims and did not comply with the required procedure. Therefore,
the bank, as a matter of law, wrongfully dishonored plaintiff's checks when the dishonor's justification
rested upon noncompliance with the Adverse Claim Statute.
328. N.M. STAT. ANN. §58-1-17 (1978).
329. Landrum, 104 N.M. at 57, 716 P.2d at 248.
330. Id. at 56, 716 P.2d at 247; see supra note 327.
331. 104 N.M. at 59, 716 P.2d at 250.
332. Id. at 60, 716 P.2d at 251.
333. Id. at 62, 716 P.2d at 253.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. 103 N.M. 5, 701 P.2d 1025 (Ct. App. 1985).
337. Id. at 8, 701 P.2d at 1028.
338. Id. He was quitclaiming his interest which he had already given to plaintiff.
339. Id.
340. However, because it was not properly executed the assignment was null and void as a
testamentary transfer because it was not duly executed as a will. Waiver, laches and estoppel applied
to plaintiff's claim because, after the assignment, plaintiff failed to assert any claim against or
ownership of the property. After the property was quitclaimed to the wife, she sold it to the defendants.
Although she could have informed herself of the assignment by doing a title search, she had not
done so and plaintiff had done nothing to exercise his "rights" under the assignment. Plaintiff sued
to establish his interest in an apartment building which his father assigned to him in 1956 and then
quitclaimed to someone else in 1959. Even though he had recorded his father's assignment, he did
not pursue his claims against the property by making his father's wife aware of the assignment. Id.
341. Id. at II, 701 P.2d at 1031.
342. Id. An assignee cannot become a partner without the consent of the other partners. Hammond
Oil Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 259 N.Y. 312, 181 N.E. 583 (1932).
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VI. ANTI-TRUST
In Smith Machinery Corp. v. Hesston, Inc., 3" the issue presented was
whether a manufacturer's requirement that a dealer stock certain products
constitutes an illegal tying arrangement in violation of the New Mexico
Anti-Trust Act."4 In this case, the dealer sued the manufacturer for in346
junction and declaratory relief, alleging practices in restraint of trade.
The manufacturer wanted to add a new tractor to its product line, and,
as part of its strategy, required the dealer to stock the new tractor pursuant
to the dealership contract.347 After the dealer refused to do so, the manufacturer sought to limit the dealer's purchases of certain popular equipment and machinery and then sought to terminate the dealer's distributorship
altogether.348 The dealer claimed that the manufacturer conditioned or
tied the sale of the popular equipment to the sale of the new tractor line
and that this practice was illegal per se.349 He also sued under the Motor
Vehicle Dealers Franchising Act. 35° The trial court had dismissed all of
the dealer's claims.35 1
After holding that the Motor Vehicle Dealers Franchising Act did not
apply to the equipment in question,352 the supreme court reiterated the
elements353 necessary to prevail on a per se tying claim: "(1) a scheme
involving two distinct products whereby a buyer must purchase the undesired ("tied") product in order to obtain the desired ("tying") product;
(2) a seller possessing sufficient economic power in the tying product
market to appreciably restrain competition in the tied product market;
and (3) an arrangement affecting a 'not insubstantial' amount of commerce." 35 4 The court stated that once these three elements have been
shown, some courts 355 have said in dicta that a defendant involved in a
per se tying arrangement may defend itself by affirmatively demonstrating
a clear, legitimate business justification. 356 Examples of business justifications for tying arrangements include quality control and preservation
343. Landrum, 103 N.M. at12, 701 P.2d at 1032.
344. 102 N.M. 245, 694 P.2d 501 (1985).

345. N.M. STAT.

ANN.

§§57-1-1 to-19 (1978).

346. Smith, 102 N.M. at246, 694 P.2d at502.
347. Id. at249, 694 P.2d at505 (1985).
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. Id. at246, 694 P.2d at505; N.M. STAT. ANN. §§56-16-1 to-12 (1978).
351. Smith, 102 N.M. at246, 694 P.2d at505.
352. The Act applies to motor vehicles. The equipment in question was not a vehicle since it
was not self-propelled.
353. The elements have been set out in federal court cases. See, e.g., N. Pac. Ry. v. United
States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
354. Smith, 102 N.M. at250, 694 P.2d at509.
355. See e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
356. 102 N.M. at 250, 694 P.2d at 509.

Spring 1987]

COMMERCIAL LAW

of goodwill, establishment of an entire new industry, and introduction of
a new product by a small company attempting to brea into a new market. 357
The court analyzed several federal anti-trust cases358 dealing with the per
se rule and concluded that there is no well-established exception of the
per se rule which could be applied in the case at bar."' The court held
that the dealer had presented a prima facie case of a per se anti-trust
violation and overturned the district court's dismissal of the anti-trust
claim.3 °
CONCLUSION
This survey period proved prolific in the commercial law area. The
majority of the cases simply delineate elements of particular doctrines
and reiterate or clarify the law. The practitioner should be wary, however,
of the conflicting case law created by the court's decision in GMAC.

357. Id.
358. Osborn v. Sinclair Refining Co., 286 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 963
(1961); Brandeis Machinery & Supply v. Barber-Greene Co., 1973-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 74-672
(W.D.Ky. 1973), affid, 503 F.2d 503 (6th Cir. 1974); Earley Ford Tractor, Inc. v. Hesston Corp.
556 F. Supp. 544 (W.D. Mo. 1983).
359. Smith, 102 N.M. at 253, 694 P.2d at 508.
360. Id. at 254, 694 P.2d at 513.

